Presidents Aren’t Above the Law: The Paula Jones Dismissal

On April 1, 1998, U.S. District Judge Susan Webber Wright of the Eastern District of Arkansas granted President Bill Clinton’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Paula Jones’s sexual harassment lawsuit on the grounds that it presented no “genuine issues” of material fact warranting a trial.

This ruling capped a legal saga that began in 1994, tested the bounds of presidential immunity, and set the stage for the more explosive Lewinsky scandal later that same year.

Paula Corbin Jones, then a state employee in Little Rock, filed suit on May 6, 1994, alleging that Bill Clinton—then Governor of Arkansas—had propositioned her and exposed himself during a conference at the Excelsior Hotel on May 8, 1991.

Seeking damages under federal civil-rights statutes and Arkansas tort law, Jones claimed that Clinton’s conduct was not only offensive but had also led to retaliatory mistreatment in her job.

After Judge Wright initially deferred consideration of Clinton’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, the Eighth Circuit held that the President was not immune from civil suits for unofficial acts. President Clinton appealed, and on May 27, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled 9–0 in *Clinton v. Jones*, that the Constitution affords no temporary immunity for private actions arising from pre-presidential conduct. Justice Stevens’s opinion emphasized that “separation of powers does not require that federal courts delay all private civil lawsuits against the President until he leaves office”.

With immunity off the table, the case returned to Judge Wright’s courtroom for discovery and trial preparation. Throughout early 1998, both sides filed extensive briefs and evidentiary submissions: Jones’s team asserted that Clinton’s alleged conduct constituted sexual harassment and civil assault, while the President’s counsel argued that, even taking the allegations as true, they failed under Arkansas’s rigorous “outrage” and “sexual assault” standards.

In a 39-page ruling delivered on April 1, Judge Wright granted summary judgment to President Clinton, finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that Jones’s allegations satisfied the legal elements of sexual harassment or civil assault under Arkansas law.

She wrote that, although “the alleged conduct, if true, may be characterized as boorish and offensive,” it “falls far short of the rigorous standards for establishing a claim of outrage” and lacks evidence of “criminal sexual assault”. Noting that Jones remained employed for nearly two years after the incident without complaint to supervisors, Wright concluded there was “no genuine issue” for trial.

News of the dismissal rippled swiftly through Washington and beyond. President Clinton, then concluding a six-nation Africa tour, was reportedly so surprised he thought his attorney was pulling an April Fools’ prank from halfway across Dakar.

Jones’s lawyers immediately announced plans to appeal, framing the decision as a setback not for their client but for accountability. The Rutherford Institute, which advised Jones, vowed to challenge the ruling in the Eighth Circuit, underscoring the case’s implications for civil-rights.

The April 1 dismissal solidified the practical impact of *Clinton v. Jones*: sitting Presidents could answer to civil claims in federal court for unofficial actions, but plaintiffs still bore the heavy burden of proof under state and federal law. The ruling also raised questions about the intersection of political power and personal accountability, foreshadowing how allegations of private misconduct might reshape public office.

In the years since, *Clinton v. Jones* has been cited in debates over presidential accountability, from congressional subpoenas to impeachment inquiries, affirming that no one—not even the President—is above the law’s procedural demands.

 

While Jones’s appeal made its way through the courts, the spectacle of the Lewinsky scandal erupted in August 1998, drawing renewed attention to Clinton’s perjury under oath in the Jones litigation. Ultimately, on November 13, 1998, President Clinton agreed to an out-of-court settlement, paying Paula Jones $850,000 to drop the suit—explicitly without any admission of wrongdoing. That resolution both closed the civil chapter and injected fresh fuel into the impeachment proceedings, as Republicans argued the payment vindicated Jones’s claims, while Democrats decried it as a mere cost of litigation.

The saga of Jones v. Clinton underscores how civil litigation can intersect with presidential politics in complex ways. Today, as debates over executive accountability intensify—from congressional oversight of federal agencies to questions about modern presidents’ private conduct—*Clinton v. Jones* serves as a reminder that the rule of law applies even at the highest echelons of power. More than two decades later, the case continues to guide courts balancing separation-of-powers concerns with citizens’ rights to seek redress, ensuring that “no man [or woman] is above the law,” even if, on one April Fools’ Day, that law seemed to play a prank of its own.