The outbreak of Sudan’s civil war on April 15, 2023, marked a grim turning point for a nation already struggling with decades of instability. The conflict did not ignite in isolation but was the culmination of years of unresolved political rifts, failed democratic transitions, economic hardship, and military rivalries. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), under the leadership of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo known widely as Hemedti engaged in violent confrontation over power consolidation, military integration, and control of key state resources. What began as a dispute between former allies soon devolved into one of the most devastating wars in modern African history.
At the heart of the conflict lay the question of authority in post-revolution Sudan. After the ousting of long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019, both the SAF and the RSF emerged as the dominant factions shaping the country’s political future. While nominally aligned in the transitional government that followed Bashir’s fall, deep-rooted competition for dominance festered. The transitional framework, intended to eventually return Sudan to civilian rule, instead hardened into a fragile power-sharing arrangement between military elites. The RSF, originally formed from the Janjaweed militias notorious for their role in the Darfur conflict, had grown into a parallel army with its own funding streams, foreign alliances, and ambitions. The SAF, the traditional military apparatus of the state, viewed the RSF’s autonomy as a threat to national cohesion and military supremacy.
The immediate spark for open warfare occurred in Khartoum, the nation’s capital, where both forces vied for strategic installations. The RSF launched coordinated assaults on the presidential palace, the international airport, and key command centers. Within days, much of Khartoum descended into chaos as neighborhoods became battlegrounds, and residents were trapped in their homes without access to food, water, or medical care. Hospitals were targeted or occupied, power and communication lines were severed, and law enforcement evaporated.
The RSF’s tactics relied heavily on rapid urban advances, leveraging their mobility and knowledge of guerrilla warfare in densely populated areas. Their success in Khartoum emboldened further expansion into strategic cities across central and western Sudan. Darfur, historically a stronghold for the RSF’s operations, quickly fell under their control. Cities like El Geneina, Nyala, and Zalingei saw renewed cycles of violence reminiscent of the atrocities committed in the early 2000s. In Kordofan and Gezira, the RSF capitalized on local grievances and SAF withdrawal to consolidate influence.
By mid-2023, Sudan had effectively fragmented. The central government, nominally under Burhan’s control, operated with limited authority, while Hemedti’s forces governed substantial territory. The conflict soon acquired regional dimensions as external powers began to back either side, turning Sudan into a proxy battleground. The RSF reportedly received logistical and financial support from the United Arab Emirates, as well as military assistance from the Russian-linked Wagner Group and elements in eastern Libya. Meanwhile, the SAF sought and received backing from Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, leading to a geopolitical quagmire where foreign agendas intensified domestic suffering.
The situation on the ground steadily deteriorated into a humanitarian nightmare. Civilian infrastructure collapsed under the pressure of shelling, aerial bombardment, and blockades. Cities once bustling with life became ghost towns filled with the dead and dying. The health system, already fragile before the war, disintegrated entirely in conflict zones. Access to emergency care, maternal health services, and chronic disease treatment vanished. Humanitarian corridors were routinely attacked or obstructed by both sides, though RSF-controlled zones in Darfur and western Sudan became particularly perilous for aid convoys.
By the end of 2023, the United Nations and various international agencies warned of mass starvation, disease outbreaks, and irreversible harm to an entire generation of Sudanese children. More than five million people were displaced within Sudan, while millions more fled to neighboring Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt. The refugee influx overwhelmed border towns like Adré in Chad, where makeshift camps struggled to provide basic sanitation, shelter, and nutrition. Thousands perished from starvation or preventable illness while attempting to escape the violence.
International mediation efforts repeatedly faltered. Ceasefire agreements, often brokered by African Union or Gulf-state intermediaries, were routinely violated within hours. The entrenched positions of both SAF and RSF leaders made genuine negotiations elusive. Burhan, presenting himself as the defender of Sudanese sovereignty, refused to recognize Hemedti’s authority. Conversely, Hemedti declared the SAF leadership illegitimate and increasingly framed his cause as a liberation struggle against old regime loyalists.
In January 2024, the tide began to turn. After months of territorial losses, the SAF restructured its command hierarchy and intensified coordination with Iranian and Egyptian advisers. Precision airstrikes, armored ground offensives, and newly trained brigades launched a systematic campaign to retake urban strongholds. The siege of El Obeid, a city held by the RSF since early in the war, was lifted in February 2025 after a bloody campaign lasting over a year. The victory marked a significant morale boost for government forces and signaled renewed SAF momentum.
By March 2025, SAF troops had re-entered Khartoum and reclaimed the presidential palace, the central bank, and the international airport. However, their victory came at enormous cost. Much of the capital lay in ruins. Residential areas had been leveled, and the few remaining civilians faced famine, disease, and unrelenting trauma. The symbolism of retaking the city did little to alter the fact that large swaths of the country remained under RSF control, particularly in the west.
The RSF, though driven from the capital, responded with intensified brutality. In January 2025, they launched a drone strike on El Fasher’s Saudi Maternal Teaching Hospital, killing dozens of civilians, including children and medical staff. The incident provoked international condemnation but failed to deter further RSF escalations. Between April 11 and 13, 2025, RSF units stormed Zamzam displacement camp near El Fasher. Over the course of three days, between 1,500 and 2,000 civilians were massacred in what has since been described as one of the worst atrocities of the war. Eyewitnesses described systematic killings, sexual violence, and the use of fire to destroy entire sections of the camp. Survivors recounted being hunted through makeshift tents as humanitarian workers were executed alongside displaced families.
The war in Darfur took on an explicitly ethnic dimension. Reports emerged of the RSF targeting non-Arab communities, especially the Masalit people, echoing the genocidal violence of past decades. Entire villages were razed, wells poisoned, and mass graves uncovered. The United States formally declared the situation a genocide in April 2025, prompting calls for international intervention. Yet, despite mounting evidence and rising global outrage, substantive foreign military involvement remained limited. Western nations, embroiled in other global crises, opted for statements over action. Meanwhile, regional actors prioritized their strategic interests in Sudan over the welfare of its citizens.
In a provocative move in April 2025, the RSF announced the formation of a breakaway administration named the Government of Peace and Unity. The new entity, established in Nyala, declared its intention to govern western and southern Sudan under a self-authored constitution. Hemedti assumed the role of president, surrounded by RSF commanders elevated to civilian posts. The creation of parallel institutions—judicial, legislative, and administrative—fueled fears that Sudan was permanently fragmenting into rival states. Analysts warned of a Libyan-style partition scenario, where a divided Sudan becomes a long-term fixture of instability and external manipulation.
The international community remained divided in response. Some nations quietly supported the RSF’s vision of decentralized governance, viewing it as a buffer against SAF dominance. Others feared the precedent of legitimizing a warlord-led state emerging from ethnic violence. In truth, Sudan had already ceased to function as a unified nation-state. Trade routes were severed, banking systems collapsed, and regional commanders operated independently of Khartoum or Nyala’s directives.
The foreign military dimension of the conflict grew more pronounced in mid-2025. Sudanese officials accused the UAE of not only funding the RSF but also deploying Colombian mercenaries to augment their battlefield strength. The UAE denied these allegations, but independent observers confirmed sightings of non-Arabic-speaking fighters operating in RSF units. The SAF, for its part, deepened its reliance on Iranian drone technology and Egyptian logistical support, further blurring the lines between domestic conflict and international proxy war.
Meanwhile, the civilian population continued to bear the brunt of hostilities. In Al-Fashir, a city under prolonged siege, food deliveries failed to arrive for months. Children died of malnutrition in makeshift clinics, and families resorted to eating leaves, animal feed, and even dirt to survive. The World Food Programme warned that hundreds of thousands faced imminent starvation, yet international aid remained drastically underfunded. As of August 2025, only twenty-three percent of the United Nations’ emergency appeal had been met. The lack of resources crippled efforts to establish safe zones, reopen hospitals, or evacuate vulnerable populations.
Education, too, has become a casualty of the war. With schools shuttered across much of the country, a generation of Sudanese youth now grows up without access to formal learning. Makeshift schools in refugee camps struggle with overcrowding, lack of materials, and trauma among both teachers and students. Women and girls, disproportionately affected by displacement and sexual violence, face additional barriers to accessing education and healthcare.
As the war grinds into its third year, there is no clear end in sight. Diplomatic efforts remain stalled. Neither Burhan nor Hemedti has signaled a willingness to step down or compromise meaningfully. The conflict’s trajectory increasingly points toward a protracted stalemate, with Sudan divided between a militarized north and east under SAF control, and a warlord-led west and south governed by the RSF. The humanitarian toll is staggering, the political structure shattered, and the societal fabric torn beyond recognition.
Sudan’s civil war is not merely a contest of arms but a profound tragedy of failed leadership, external interference, and international apathy. The cost is measured not only in destroyed cities and lost territory but in millions of lives uprooted, traumatized, or ended. The absence of accountability, the unchecked impunity of armed actors, and the slow international response all underscore the failures of the modern world to prevent preventable horrors.
In the face of this ongoing catastrophe, the resilience of ordinary Sudanese people offers the only glimmer of hope. In refugee camps, amidst rubble and grief, communities continue to organize. Teachers attempt to run schools. Doctors operate without supplies. Mothers shield their children from gunfire and despair. Their perseverance speaks to a spirit that war has not extinguished.
Yet resilience alone cannot save a nation from collapse. Without sustained international engagement, an end to foreign meddling, and a serious commitment to justice and reconciliation, Sudan risks becoming a permanent zone of conflict. The war that began with ambition and betrayal in 2023 could define the country’s fate for decades to come.
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